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101 
“WHO SHOULD REGULATE CLASS 
ACTION LAWYERS?”† 
Nancy J. Moore* 
In this article, Professor Nancy Moore explores ethical issues 
implicated by class action litigation.  She begins by pointing out that 
neither the Model Code of Professional Responsibility nor the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct deal specifically with the ethics of class 
action lawyers.  The author, who acted as Chief Reporter of the 
Ethics 2000 Commission, argues that the Commission’s decision not 
to draft rules directly addressing the ethics of class action litigation 
was appropriate.  Focusing on the problem of conflicting interests, 
she argues that the confusion surrounding the ethics of class action 
lawyers can be significantly reduced by recognizing, first, that the 
class itself is the client and, second, that much of what are currently 
described as “conflicts of interest” were never meant to be addressed 
by traditional conflict-of-interest doctrine.  Even if there are some 
situations in which relaxation of the ethics rules may be justified in 
order to accommodate class actions, these situations are better 
addressed by case law interpreting Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  The author argues that in addressing adequacy of 
representation issues under Rule 23, courts should still take into 
account many of the principles and concerns motivating Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ethical issues arise frequently in class action litigation.1  These 
issues include conflicts of interest,2 solicitation,3 application of the no-
 
 † ©2002 Nancy J. Moore. 
 * Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Chief Reporter for the ABA Commission 
on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (“Ethics 2000 Commission”). 
I am grateful for the helpful comments of Susan Koniak, Charles Silver, Allan Stein, and 
participants in the University of Illinois Symposium on “Ethics 2000 and Beyond: Reform or 
Professional Responsibility as Usual?” and the February 2002 Rutgers Law School-Camden Faculty 
Worshop. 
 1. See, e.g., Brian V. Waid, Ethical Problems of the Class Action Practitioner: Continued Neglect 
by the Drafters of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 LOY. L. REV. 1047, 1047–48 
(1981).  See generally HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15 (3d 
ed. 1992) (section entitled “Class Action Abuses and Legal Ethics”). 
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contact rule,4 the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees,5 and the attorney-
witness rule.6  There has been considerable difficulty applying existing 
rules of conduct to these situations, partly because of confusion 
regarding the relationship among class counsel, the named class 
representatives and absent members of the class.7  Thus, it is often said 
that “the ethics rules cannot be mechanically applied to class actions.”8  
As for conflicting interests—perhaps the most pressing problem facing 
class action lawyers—some courts go even further to state that a strict 
reading of the conflict-of-interest rules in class actions should be 
tempered, because the very nature of a class action is to combine many 
divergent interests.9 
Despite the frequency with which the propriety of lawyers’ conduct 
is litigated in class action lawsuits, neither the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility10 (Model Code) nor the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct11 (Model Rules) specifically addresses the ethics of 
 
 2. See, e.g., NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, §§ 15.24–15.25 (simultaneous or subsequent 
representation of adverse clients, opt-outs, and class members); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the 
Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Ethics and the Settlement of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
1159 (1995); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982); Waid, 
supra note 1, at 1061–74; Gregg H. Curry, Comment, Conflicts of Interest Problems for Lawyers 
Representing a Class in a Class Action Lawsuit, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 397 (2000); Note, Developments in 
the Law—Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1447–57 (1981) 
[hereinafter Developments]. 
 3. See, e.g., NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 15.04. 
 4. See, e.g., id. §§ 15.05–15.20 (discussing communication with class members and potential class 
members, including contacts by class counsel and counsel for adversary); Debra Lyn Bassett, Pre-
Certification Communication Ethics in Class Actions, 36 GA. L. REV. 353 (2002) (same). 
 5. See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility, 
Financial Arrangements in Class Actions, and the Code of Professional Responsibility, 20 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 831 (1993); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. 
L. REV. 669 (1986); Heather M. Williams, Note, Attorney Fees in Class Action Lawsuits: Implementing 
Change to Protect Plaintiffs from Unethical Attorney Behavior, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 68 (1998). 
 6. See, e.g., NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 15.23. 
 7. See, e.g., Waid, supra note 1, at 1048. 
 8. Koniak, supra note 2, at 1121 (referring to this statement as an “oft-made remark”); see also, 
e.g., Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 589–90 (3d Cir. 1999) (both citing and quoting Agent 
Orange and Judge Adams’s concurring opinion in Corn Derivatives); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he traditional rules that have been developed in the course of 
attorneys’ representation of the interests of clients outside of the class action context should not be 
mechanically applied to the problems that arise in the settlement of class action litigation.”); In re 
Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts 
cannot mechanically transpose to class actions the rules developed in the traditional lawyer-client 
setting context . . . .”). 
 9. See Lazy Oil Co., 166 F.3d at 589–90. 
 10. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1981).  The Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility was replaced by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983.  See generally 
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.4 (1986). 
 11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2001) (previous version of the Model Rules prior to 
extensive amendments in February 2002 resulting from the recommendations of the Ethics 2000 
Commission). 
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class action lawyers to any significant extent.12  Given this lack of 
guidance, both the Kutak Commission, which drafted the Model Rules,13 
and the Ethics 2000 Commission14 (the Commission), which recently 
proposed comprehensive amendments to the Model Rules,15 were urged 
to adopt a separate class action rule.16  Neither did so, nor has any state 
court adopted such a rule.17  As Chief Reporter to the Ethics 2000 
Commission,18 I want to address the question of whether, at this late 
date, with all of the publicity surrounding allegations of class action 
 
 12. The Model Code contained but a single reference to class actions.  See MODEL CODE DR 2-
104(A)(5) (allowing limited solicitation in class actions).  As adopted in 1983, the Model Rules 
contained no references to class actions in the text of the rules, and only a few references in the 
comments.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 cmt. (1983) (referring to law prescribing a 
procedure for determining a fee); id. R. 1.8 cmt. (stating that consent to payment of legal fees by third 
party “may be obtained on behalf of the class by court-supervised procedure”); id. R. 6.1 cmt. (1983) 
(referring to class actions in connection with the provision of pro bono services); id. R. 7.2 cmt. (1983) 
(stating that solicitation rules do not prohibit “communications authorized by law, such as notice to 
members of a class in class action litigation”).  There were no additional references to class actions as 
of 2001, and the Ethics 2000 Commission recommended only one additional reference to class actions 
in the Comment to Rule 1.7.  See infra note 20. 
 13. See WOLFRAM, supra note 10, § 2.6.4. 
 14. In 1997, the American Bar Association (ABA) created the Commission on the Evaluation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, generally known as the Ethics 2000 Commission.  See E. Norman 
Veasey, Chair’s Introduction and Executive Summary, Comm’n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct, Report with Recommendation to the House of Delegates (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Ethics 
2000 Report], at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-report.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).  The 
Commission was charged with conducting a comprehensive review of the Model Rules.  See id.  The 
Commission issued its report in August 2001.  The ABA House of Delegates met in August 2001, 
again in February 2002, and adopted the vast majority of the Commission’s recommendations.  See 
Summary of House of Delegates Action on the Ethics 2000 Commission at the August 2001 Annual 
Meeting, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002). 
 15. Report 401, as filed by the Ethics 2000 Commission in August 2001 and as filed with 
revisions in February 2002, can be found at the Commission’s website.  See 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002). 
 16. See Waid, supra note 1 (proposal made to Kutak Commission); see also Ethics 2000 Atlanta 
Hearing (Aug. 5, 1999) (written statement of Richard A. Zitrin) [hereinafter Zitrin Testimony], at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/rzitrin.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003). 
 17. Although no state has adopted a separate class action rule, several states have adopted 
additional language in either the text or comments to the rules regarding various aspects of class action 
litigation.  None of these additions are comprehensive, however.  See, e.g., IND. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 7.3(e) (1996) (adopting provision similar to solicitation exception provision of Model 
Code); MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 14(A) (2002) (regarding simultaneous 
representation of two class actions against a single defendant and the lawyer’s duty to consider 
whether the creation of subclasses is required); MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 16 
(1998) (applying duty of candor in ex parte proceeding to joint petitions to a tribunal, including a joint 
petition to approve a class action settlement); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2002) 
(specifically exempting class actions from coverage under aggregate settlement rule); TEX. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02 cmt. 3 (1998) (stating that the ability of a class action lawyer to recommend 
settlement over the objections of a named plaintiff is an exception to the general rule that it is for the 
client to accept or reject settlements).  Jurisdictions that follow the Model Code format typically retain 
the provision allowing limited solicitation in class actions. See, e.g., IOWA CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104 (2002).  California’s rules, which are not based on either the Model Code 
or the Model Rules, have a single reference to class actions.  See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
3-510 (1996) (regarding communication of settlement offer to a client, defining “client” to refer to the 
named representatives of a class in a class action). 
 18. It goes without saying (but I will say it anyway) that this Article represents my own views 
only and, except where specifically stated, does not represent the views of the Ethics 2000 
Commission. 
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abuses,19 the Commission was justified in declining either to adopt a 
separate class action rule or to add extensive commentary addressing the 
application of the rules to class action lawsuits.20 
Not surprisingly, my answer is that yes, the Commission’s silence 
was justified,21 although I concede that there are a few places where 
 
 19. See, e.g., Tom Collins, Rulings Focus on Public Policy, Ethics in Attorney Cases: Judge Blasts 
Attorneys Suing Cruise Line, 224 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 16, 2001, at 4 (reporting judge who 
slashed class counsels’ legal fees and ordered that a quarter of the legal fees be paid in the same travel 
vouchers to be provided to plaintiff class under negotiated settlement); Karen Donovan, “Huh? I’m 
the Lead Plaintiff?” NAT’L L.J., May 24, 1999, at A1 (discussing investor who was put forward as a 
“lead plaintiff” without his knowledge or consent and whose lawyers refused to answer his questions 
regarding his status in the litigation); Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Coupons, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1995, at 
D1 (reporting criticism of class action abuses, including coupon settlements and marginal claims 
packaged for the “sole purpose of snaring fat fees”); see also, e.g., Koniak, supra note 2, at 1057–64 
(alleging possible collusion between class counsel and defendants in negotiating a “futures class” by 
class counsel simultaneously representing inventories of plaintiffs who apparently received a better 
deal outside the class settlement); Edwin Lamberth, Injustice by Process: A Look at and Proposals for 
the Problems and Abuses of the Settlement Class Action, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 149, 163 (1998) (discussing 
numerous alleged abuses, including a case in which an absent class member ended up being assessed 
attorneys fees greater than his award in negotiated settlement). 
 20. The only additional reference to class action lawsuits in the Ethics 2000 Commission 
amendments is contained in a new paragraph to the Rule 1.7 Comment.  See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 25 (2002) (stating that unnamed class members are ordinarily not 
considered to be clients for purposes of determining “directly adverse” conflicts; as a result, a lawyer 
representing a class may file a lawsuit against an unnamed class member on an unrelated subject 
without informing or seeking consent from that member).  The Commission considered but rejected a 
proposed comment along the lines of the Massachusetts Rules.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.7 (Working Draft No. 5, 1998) (discussing proposed new comment 16A); Minutes of 
the Ethics 2000 Commission (Sept. 27-28, 2000), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/092798mtg.html 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2002).  The Commission also considered but rejected a suggestion that a new 
paragraph be added to the Rule 4.2 Comment regarding communications by an opposing lawyer with 
members of a class in a class action.  See MODEL RULES R. 4.2 (Working Draft No. 4, 1998) (discussing 
proposed comment 9); Minutes of the Ethics 2000 Commission (July 7-8, 2000), at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/070700mtg.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002) (noting that the Commission 
decided against adding comment regarding communications with members of a class in a class action). 
 21. A fuller explanation of the meaning of the Commission’s silence is probably called for, 
particularly in light of Richard Zitrin’s testimony, which specifically called for the adoption of a 
separate class action rule.  The minutes of the Commission’s meetings do not indicate any discussion 
of that proposal.  Of course the Commission was aware of the proposal, which was made both in 
written and oral testimony.  See supra note 16 (citing testimony of Richard Zitrin).  Accordingly, the 
Commission’s silence means that neither the reporters nor any member of the Commission put the 
proposal on the Commission’s agenda for discussion.  My recollection is that there was informal 
discussion that any necessary clarification regarding the ambiguity of the ethical obligations of class 
action lawyers should come from law other than the Rules of Professional Conduct.  My own views at 
the time are reflected in rather brief remarks I made in a symposium on mass torts litigation.  See 
Nancy J. Moore, Ethics Matters, Too: The Significance of Professional Regulation of Attorney Fees and 
Costs in Mass Tort Litigation—A Response to Judith Resnick, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 2221–22 (2000) 
(acknowledging the failure of lawyer codes to address ethical dilemmas of class action lawyers).  That 
piece goes on to conclude that “the code format may be insufficiently flexible to adequately 
communicate the duties of class action counsel” and further, that: 
[g]iven that the resolution of ethical issues often depends on the principles set forth in other law, 
it may be preferable to continue to look to courts to provide further guidance, either by 
promulgating additional procedural rules or by addressing the ethical obligations of class lawyers 
while ruling on various procedural aspects of class action litigation. 
Id.  In writing this Article, however, I have engaged in additional research, reflection, and discussion 
with colleagues.  Thus, this Article reflects my current thinking, which is similar, but not identical, to 
the views I earlier held and expressed. 
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additional commentary would have been useful.22  There are two reasons 
for my answer.  First, I believe that much of the confusion surrounding 
the application of the ethics rules to class action lawyers could be 
significantly reduced without revising the ethics rules.  In my view, this 
could be done by resolving the issue of client identification in favor of 
the view that the class is an entity client,23 even at the precertification 
stage of the litigation,24 and by recognizing that much of what are 
currently described as “conflicts of interest” issues are in fact the type of 
agency problems that were never meant to be resolved under conflict-of-
interest doctrine.25  Second, acknowledging that there are some situations 
in which relaxation (or special application) of the ethics rules may be 
necessary to accommodate the unique needs of a class action lawsuit, I 
believe that whether and when such rules are to be relaxed is a question 
more properly decided under the law of class actions—primarily Rule 23 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure26 (FRCP) and the case law 
applying that rule—rather than under rules of professional conduct or by 
ethics committees and courts applying such rules.27 
 
 22. For example, the Commission considered a proposal drafted by Associate Reporter Carl 
Pierce to add a paragraph to the Rule 4.2 Comment to indicate how that Rule applied to class actions.  
See MODEL RULES R. 4.2, at 3, 9 (Proposed Rule 4.2 Draft No. 4, 1998) (discussing proposed 
Comment 9).  Under that proposal, after either certification of the class or expiration of the opt-out 
period, a lawyer representing a client in a class action must treat all class members as persons 
represented by the lawyer who is representing the class; prior to that period, the rule would apply only 
to communications with members of the class known to be individually represented by a lawyer.  Id.  
The proposal was based primarily on the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, which in turn 
reflected the majority of court decisions addressing this issue.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99, cmt. l & Reporter’s Note (2000).  Given that the issue has been addressed 
by courts overseeing class actions, and that there appears to be a clear majority opinion, I believe it 
would have been helpful to practicing lawyers if the Rule 4.2 Comment had adopted this approach.  I 
would, however, prefer to word the provision differently in order to avoid the implication that post-
certification class members are in fact clients of class counsel.  In my view, it would have been better to 
treat individual class members as constituents of the class and the class itself as the lawyer’s client.  See 
infra text accompanying note 53. 
 23. See infra notes 40–48 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 71–83 and accompanying text. 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. For a summary of the general requirements of Rule 23, as completely 
revised in 1966, see Charles A. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169 (1970).  Class action law also 
includes constitutional concerns; for example, due process requirements for binding absent members 
of the class.  See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846–47 (1999) (stating that mandatory 
class actions implicate the due process principle that a person is not bound by a judgment in personam 
in litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by 
service of process and that there is an applicable exception for class actions that depends on adequate 
representation by someone with same interests who is not a party); see also Koniak, supra note 2, at 
1086–1126 (discussing Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence as applied to district court opinion 
in class action involving attempted settlement of class composed of persons who had not yet suffered 
injury from asbestos exposure). 
 27. In some instances, the application of rules of professional conduct and class action law will 
overlap, as when a judge determines the size of a reasonable fee to be awarded to class counsel in a 
class action lawsuit.  Cf. Moore, supra note 21, at 2222 n.61 (suggesting that judges ruling on class 
action issues may also expand on the ethical duties of lawyers, as when “stating the circumstances 
under which lawyers are entitled to be reimbursed for the costs and expenses of litigation”).  In other 
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In this article, I focus on the issue that dominates many discussions 
of ethics and class actions—the difficulty of applying current conflict-of-
interest rules to the myriad of conflicting interests that commonly arise in 
class action lawsuits, including conflicts among class members, as well as 
between the lawyer and the class and between the class and third 
persons.  Parts I and II of the article demonstrate that the scope of the 
problem is not nearly as large as it is commonly thought to be.  In part I, 
I argue that the class should be viewed as an entity client, in which case it 
becomes clear that conflict-of-interest rules simply do not apply to 
conflicts within a class.  In part II, I eliminate from consideration those 
conflicts—like conflicts arising from the size of the lawyer’s fee—that are 
not addressed by conflict-of-interest doctrine because they are not 
unique to particular lawyers but are rather a type of agency problem that 
is endemic to legal practice. 
Parts III and IV of the article then turn to the types of conflicts that 
would be addressed by a “strict reading” of the conflict-of-interest rules.  
These conflicts include those arising from the lawyer’s duties to other 
current clients, both inside and outside the class, as well as former clients.  
In part III, I argue that from the point of view of the nonclass client, that 
there is no reason to relax the current conflict rules.  These clients are 
entitled to full disclosure of the conflict and an opportunity to find 
independent counsel (or, in some cases, to refuse to bring the action as a 
class action).  Finally, in part IV, I address these conflicts from the point 
of view of the class itself.  Here I agree that relaxation (or special 
application) of the conflict rules is probably warranted, because, 
although there are risks associated with the conflict, there may be some 
situations in which the risk is low in relation to the benefit the class may 
receive by permitting the representation to continue.  I consider several 
ways to achieve this end, arguing that it makes the most sense to leave 
these issues to be resolved under class action law—namely, under the 
rubric of a further elaboration of the adequacy of representation 
requirement of FRCP Rule 23.  Although I urge that it is class action law 
that should regulate this aspect of class counsels’ conflicts, I explain why 
I think it would be useful for courts to consider the principles and 
concepts underlying the ethics rules in their Rule 23 analysis. 
I. THE CLASS SHOULD BE VIEWED AS AN ENTITY CLIENT 
Much of the confusion surrounding the ethics of class action lawyers 
results from a mistaken belief that a “strict reading” of the ethics rules 
would make class action litigation either impossible or highly inefficient.  
Consider the question of conflicts of interest.  It is undeniable that 
conflicts of interest are inherent in class actions, as it is inevitable that 
 
instances, the application of class action law will be similar to, but not identical, to an analysis that 
would be conducted under rules of professional conduct.  See infra Part IV. 
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there will be divergent interests among the various members of the class 
itself, particularly in the remedy stage.28  Nevertheless, it is not 
necessarily the case that such conflicts would doom class actions if the 
conflict-of-interest rules are strictly applied in class action lawsuits. 
Model Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules is the general ethical rule 
addressing concurrent conflicts of a lawyer.29  Under this Rule, a 
potentially impermissible conflict exists whenever “there is a significant 
risk that the representation of one or more clients may be materially 
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client 
or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”30  Given such a 
conflict, the lawyer must refuse the representation, or withdraw from 
existing representation, unless “each affected client gives informed 
consent” and the “lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able 
to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected 
client.”31  According to Brian Waid, an early proponent of a separate 
class action rule, Rule 1.7, if strictly construed, would prevent lawyers 
from handling class actions at all because “‘the lawyers’ ability to 
consider, recommend or carry out a course of action’ on behalf of the 
class, a subclass or the class representative may be ‘adversely affected by 
the lawyer’s responsibilities’ to one of the other categories of ‘clients.’”32  
Moreover, such “conflicts” cannot be cured by informed consent, due to 
the lawyer’s inability to obtain the consent of absent class members.33  
 
 28. See, e.g., Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“[C]onflicts of interest are built into the device of the class action, where a single lawyer may be 
representing a class consisting of thousands of persons not all of whom will have identical interests or 
views.”); 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 11.12, at 
11–33 (3d ed. 2002) (“It is almost inevitable that class members will have some divergent views on the 
advisability of settlement and other issues.”); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The 
Role of Plaintiff’s Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1483–1500 (1998) 
(arguing the unreality of suggestion that due process prohibits conflicts among class members). 
 29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002). 
 30. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2) (2002). 
 31. Id. R 1.7(b) (2002). 
 32. Waid, supra note 1, at 1071–72 (quoting ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF 
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (proposed final draft May 
30, 1981)).  As a result of the 2002 amendments recommended by the Ethics 2000 Commission, Rule 
1.7 has been reorganized; however, with the exception of a new requirement that waivers be confirmed 
in writing, there was no intended change in substance. See Ethics 2000 Report, supra note 14.  Waid 
was commenting on an earlier draft of the 1983 version of Rule 1.7.  Waid, supra note 1, at 1049 n.8 
and accompanying text (referring to May 30, 1981 proposed final draft). 
 33. Cf. Waid, supra note 1, at 1072 (discussing “conflict” created by class counsel’s interest in 
recovery of fees).  Waid does not discuss the comment to Rule 1.8(f), which provides, with respect to 
third party payment of legal fees, that “[w]here the client is a class, consent may be obtained on behalf 
of the class by court-supervised procedure.”  ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional 
Standards, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Rule 1.8 Comment (proposed final draft May 30, 1981); see 
also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. (2001).  The reason may be either that he was 
unaware of this provision, that he thought the provision applied only to consent given under that rule, 
or that he was aware that courts have not developed any procedures to consent to conflicts affecting a 
class.  That statement has been eliminated from the Rule 1.8 Comment as a result of the 2002 
amendments.  See id. R. 1.8 cmt. (2002). 
In Part IV of this Article, I consider, but ultimately reject, the use of consent by a court or 
supervised by a court as a means of satisfying the requirements of Rule 1.7 in class actions.  In my 
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Under this analysis, it is self-evident that a strict reading of the conflict 
rules must be tempered if the inherently diverging interests in class 
actions are to be accommodated.34 
But this analysis assumes that each class member is or should be 
considered a “client” for purposes of this Rule.35  There is no single view 
of who is the “client” of a class action lawyer.36  According to the 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, the named class 
representatives are clients of the lawyers for some purposes,37 and even 
other class members may have “some characteristics” of clients.38  At 
least one court has declared that there is “in effect” an “attorney-client 
relationship between the absent class members and the attorney.”39 
But these are strained and unhelpful readings of many of the cases.  
The problem with characterizing either named representatives or 
 
view, when the question is one of protecting the members of the class who are not otherwise 
represented by the lawyer, it is better to suspend application of the conflicts rules, deferring to a 
judicial determination of the adequacy of representation under Rule 23—a determination that should 
be “informed by” the concepts of those rules but that does not literally apply the rules.  See infra Part 
IV. 
 34. Cf. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON THE SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, FINAL REPORT 28 
n. 69 (2002) [hereinafter SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL] (describing result in Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco 
Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 35. Waid, supra note 1, at 1071 (lamenting that the word “client” remains undefined for 
purposes of a class action). 
 36. See, e.g., NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 15.03 (discussing three different perspectives 
on relationship between class representative or counsel and absent class members); Developments, 
supra note 2, at 1449–54 (discussing various unitary and multiple client theories).  The issue is 
addressed only indirectly in the Model Rules, with ambiguous and conflicting implications.  See, e.g., 
MODEL RULES R. 1.7 cmt. 25 (2002) (“When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of 
plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not 
considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying [the “directly adverse” conflicts 
provision] of this Rule.”); id. R. 1.8 cmt. 13 (2002) (“Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or 
defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer relationship with each 
member of the class.”); id. R. 7.3 cmt. 4 (2002) (stating that rules prohibiting solicitation of clients “do 
not prohibit communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action 
litigation”).  This ambiguity and conflict merely reflect the unsettled state of the law as reflected in 
other sources.  See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt f. (2000).  There is a 
cross-reference here to § 125, Comment f, for conflict of interest issues, but that section does not 
address the question of who is the client in a class action lawsuit. 
 38. Id. § 14 cmt. f.  The cross-references here are to § 70, Comment c (providing indirect support 
for the proposition that the confidential communications of a class action member to the class lawyer 
may be privileged) and to § 99, Comment l (stating that opposing counsel may not be free to 
communicate with class members except through class action counsel).  In my view, rather than 
characterizing these sections as treating class members as clients, or as having characteristics of clients, 
it would be better to view them as recognizing that class members are constituents of an entity client—
the class—just as individual corporate employees are constituents of a corporate client, who may 
provide privileged communications to corporate counsel and be off-limits to opposing clients under 
the no-contact rule.  See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 402 (1981) (holding that 
certain corporate employees’ communications to corporate counsel were privileged communications 
of the corporation); MODEL RULES R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002) (application of no-contact rule to prevent 
contact with certain constituents of an organizational client). 
 39. Cullen v. New York Civil Serv. Comm’n, 435 F. Supp. 546, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); see also 
Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., 541 F.2d 832, 834–35 (9th Cir. 1976) (“The class is not the client.  
The class attorney continues to have responsibilities to each individual member of the class . . . .”). 
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unnamed members of the class as “clients,” or even as having the 
“characteristics of clients” in some cases, is that for the purposes that 
appear to count most, these persons are not treated like clients.  Most 
notably, class counsel can recommend a settlement over the objections of 
the named representatives.40  As a result, it is hard to see how even 
named representatives can be considered “clients” of the lawyer in any 
meaningful sense of the word.  Moreover, viewing the class as an entity 
client is not inconsistent with recognizing that class counsel has 
significant responsibilities to the individual class members, just as 
viewing an estate as an entity client does not preclude a finding that the 
estate lawyer has responsibilities to either the fiduciary or the 
beneficiaries.41  As for decisions prohibiting opposing counsel from 
contacting class members directly, the same result could be achieved 
without characterizing class members as “clients” or having 
“characteristics of clients.”42 
In my opinion, the better view is that the class itself is an entity 
client, just as corporations, partnerships, and other voluntary (and even 
involuntary43) associations may be entity clients under Rule 1.13.44  This 
view has not been explicitly adopted except by a handful of 
commentators,45 but I believe that it has the best fit with class action case 
 
 40. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 2, at 1450. 
 41. Cf. Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who Is the Client?, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1319, 1335 (1994) (referring to how Model Rule 1.13 envisions the question of who 
is the attorney’s client).  But see Mandujano, 541 F.2d at 834 (noting that the class “is not a legal 
entity”). 
 42. Cf. MODEL RULES R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002) (applying no-contact rule to prohibit contacts with 
certain constituents of an organizational client). 
 43. See, e.g., Pennell, supra note 41, at 1335 (“Nothing in the operation of Model Rule 1.13 
suggests . . . that voluntariness is a requisite to recognition as an organization for purposes of applying 
this rule.”); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV 
913, 921–22 (1998) (referring to some entities that are not truly voluntary, such a trade unions and 
municipalities). 
 44. MODEL RULES R. 1.13(a) (2002) (“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization 
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”); id. R. 1.13(a) cmt. 1 
(2002) (describing organizational client as a “legal entity [that] cannot act except through its officers, 
directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents”).  I prefer the term “entity” to 
“organization” and will use that term throughout this Article.  See also sources cited infra note 45.  
The fact that a class can also be viewed as an aggregate or group of individuals does not in itself defeat 
the concept of a class as an entity client.  Cf. ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 91-361 n.2 (1991) (stating that partnerships are entity clients under Rule 1.13, even though 
“for some purposes, often involving the substantive rights and liabilities of partners, a partnership is 
treated as an ‘aggregate’ or group of individuals”). 
 45. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 13 (1996); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients 
or Law, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE 177, 178–79 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); Shapiro, supra note 43, at 
923–34.  But see Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., 541 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1976) (“The class is 
not the client.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 380–99 (2000) (arguing that viewing the class as 
an entity is a legal fiction that is neither useful nor plausible); Developments, supra note 2, at 1450–51 
(characterizing the view of class as a legal entity as one of several “unitary client” theories, but then 
rejecting this view). 
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law46 and provides the most workable solution for purposes of applying 
the ethics rules.  Indeed, it fits nicely with recently proposed 
amendments to FRCP Rule 23, under which a new paragraph (g) clearly 
states that “[a]n attorney appointed to serve as class counsel must fairly 
and adequately represent the interests of the class.”47  As further 
explained in the Committee Note, this provision “articulates the 
obligation of class counsel to represent the interests of the class, as 
opposed to the potentially conflicting interests of individual class 
members.”48 
Of course, by its terms, proposed Rule 23(g) would apply only after 
a lawyer is appointed as class counsel—that is, after the certification 
stage of a class action lawsuit.49  Who is the lawyer’s client prior to 
certification?  Must it be the named representatives?  In my view, it is 
possible for the lawyer to view even the putative class as a client, or 
better yet, a prospective client.50  This is apparently what is contemplated 
by proposed Rule 23(g), as evidenced by the drafters’ acknowledgment 
that “[b]efore certification, counsel may undertake actions tentatively on 
behalf of the class,” such as “discussion of a possible settlement of the 
action by counsel before the class is certified.”51  According to the 
drafters, such “pre-certification activities anticipate later appointment as 
class counsel.”52  Moreover, “by later applying for such appointment 
counsel is representing to the court that the activities were undertaken in 
the best interests of the class,” and “[b]y presenting such a pre-
certification settlement for approval under Rule 23(e) and seeking 
appointment as class counsel, for example, counsel represents that the 
 
 46. In particular, it fits with the case law holding that class counsel can recommend a settlement 
over the objection of the named representatives.  See Developments, supra note 2, at 1450.  If the 
named representatives cannot veto a settlement, then in my view it makes no sense to call them the 
clients of class counsel.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a) (2002) (“A lawyer shall abide by a client’s 
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.”).  And if the named representatives are 
not the clients, and the class as an entity is not the client, then does class counsel have no client at all?  
See Donovan, supra note 19 (quoting class action lawyer William S. Lerach as having said to Forbes 
magazine, “‘I have the greatest practice in the world.  I have no clients.’”).  For a discussion of both 
the entity client theory and the case law treating class members like clients for purposes of the no-
contact rule, see supra note 38. 
 47. Letter from David F. Levi, Chair, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to Honorable Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (May 20, 2002) [hereinafter Report of the 
Civil Rules Advisory Committee], at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2002/CVRulesJC.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2003).  The proposal has been approved by the Judicial Conference and is currently 
pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.  See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1202.html (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2003). 
 48. Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 47, at 110 (Committee Note) 
(emphasis added). 
 49. Id. at 108. 
 50. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 1.18 (2002) (clarifying lawyers duties regarding confidentiality 
and conflicts of interests with regard to prospective clients). 
 51. Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 47, at 281. 
 52. Id. 
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settlement provisions are fair, reasonable, and adequate for the class.”53  
This result is analogous to decisions finding that a lawyer who forms a 
corporation can be deemed retroactively to have represented the 
corporation, even in the period prior to incorporation.54 
If the class itself is an entity client, something like a corporation,55 
then the named class representatives are constituents of the class, more 
like corporate officers or directors than individual clients.  Continuing 
with the analogy, the absent class members can then be viewed as akin to 
corporate shareholders.  Under this view, Model Rule 1.7 simply does 
not—nor should it—apply to conflicts of interest within the class itself, 
just as it does not apply to the possibly conflicting interests of the 
members of the board of directors or the shareholders of a corporate 
client.56 
To be sure, a class differs from other types of entity clients under 
Model Rule 1.13.57  For one thing, it is the court, rather than a decision-
making body within the class itself, that is empowered to make decisions 
normally reserved for clients.58  In addition, class members differ from 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis. 1992).  I disagree with this case in its 
holding that once the corporation is created, it becomes the only client, displacing the corporate 
organizers, who become “retroactive non-clients.”  Whether the lawyer should be viewed as having 
represented both the corporation and one or more of the individual incorporators should depend on 
the facts of each case, e.g., whether the lawyer expressly or impliedly agreed to represent both or 
whether the incorporator reasonably believed that the lawyer was representing her individually.  See 
generally Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to ‘Non-Clients’: Reconceptualizing the 
Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 
S.C. L. REV. 659 (1994).  For an interpretation of Jesse more amenable to this view, see Note, An 
Expectations Approach to Client Identity, 106 HARV. L. REV. 687, 696 (1993) (“Treating pre-
incorporation individual representation, absent evidence to the contrary, as entity representation 
accords with an organizer’s reasonable expectations during the incorporation phase of the company’s 
existence.” (emphasis added)). 
 55. A class may be “something like” a corporation, but there are significant differences.  See 
infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 56. Thus, application of Rule 4.2 merely requires identification of which members of the class 
constitute the client for purposes of the rule precluding an adversary from contacting the client 
without the consent of the class attorney.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 
(2002) (applying Rule 4.2 in the case of an organization client like a corporation); see also infra note 
98. 
 57. Strictly speaking, it is not necessary to adopt the entity client in order to conclude that Rule 
1.7 does not apply to conflicts of interest within the class itself.  That view is, in effect, what courts 
have been doing when they suspend “strict application” of the conflicts rule for various purposes.  See, 
e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text.  One important advantage of the entity view, however, is 
that it makes it relatively easy to apply Rule 1.7 to conflicts that pit the interests of the class as a whole 
against either the lawyer’s own interests or the lawyer’s duties to another client or a third person.  See 
infra Part II. 
Koniak and Cohen suggest that Rule 1.13 is geared too much toward the representation of large, 
publicly held corporations, and thus does not adequately guide lawyers when representing other 
entities, such as partnerships and limited liability entities.  See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 45, at 183–
85. An additional difficulty in representing a class as an entity is the lack of a well-developed body of 
law that structures the entity, which would make it easier to determine how lawyers should conduct 
themselves in the representation.  See id. at 185. 
 58. Thus, the court determines whether a class action can be maintained, when and how the 
members of the class receive notice of the class action, whether the class will be divided into 
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either management or shareholders of a corporation because their rights 
are directly adjudicated in the class action lawsuit.59  Moreover, 
characterizing the class itself as an entity client does not by itself solve 
the problem of delineating the duties owed by class counsel to the named 
and absent members of the class, and class counsel certainly need more 
direction than current law provides.60  As a result, one could argue that 
just as lawyers owe some ethical duties to some non-clients, such as 
prospective clients,61 the Model Rules should include either 
modifications of Rule 1.7 to extend its reach to conflicts within a class62 
or a separate class action rule that delineates class counsel’s duties with 
respect to such conflicts.63 
 
subclasses, and when a class can be dismissed or compromised.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)–(e).  In 
addition, the court appoints class counsel and determines the fee award.  See, e.g., COURT AWARDED 
ATTORNEY FEES: REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, reprinted in 108 F.R.D. 237, 256–57 
(1985); SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, supra note 34. 
 59. In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that at least some conflicts 
among members require the creation of subclasses, with separate representation, and it is the lawyer’s 
duty to bring these conflicts to the attention of the court.  See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591, 626–28 (1997).  Finally, it should be noted that the definition of the class—i.e., determining 
who is a member and who is not—is entirely within the control of the lawyer, at least initially.  See, 
e.g., Koniak & Cohen, supra note 45, at 178 (noting that “class counsel plays an important, and 
typically exclusive, role in selecting and controlling the class representatives and shaping the size and 
purpose of the enterprise”).  For a detailed discussion of the problems inherent in one effort to control 
the shape of the class, apparently for the benefit of class counsel, see Koniak, supra note 2, at 1137–45 
(questioning why three of the named representatives in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 
610 (3d Cir. 1996), were not included in inventory cases settled outside the class for higher damages 
than they would receive as class members). 
 60. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 45, at 193 (stating that class action law fails to provide 
sufficient structure for regulation of class as entity). 
 61. See MODEL RULES R. 1.18 (2002) (detailing duties to prospective clients, including conflict of 
interest duties less stringent than those owed to clients or former clients). 
 62. See e.g., MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 14A (2002). 
A lawyer who undertakes to represent a class should make an initial determination whether 
subclasses within the class should have separate representation because their interests differ in 
material respects from other segments of the class.  Moreover, the lawyer who initially determines 
that subclasses are not necessary should revisit that determination as the litigation or settlement 
discussions proceed because as discovery or settlement talks proceed the interests of subgroups 
may begin to diverge significantly. . . . The lawyer has the responsibility to request that separate 
representation be provided to protect the interests of subgroups within the class. 
Id. 
 63. Neither Waid nor Zitrin provided any particular specificity regarding the content of such a 
rule.  Waid proposed a new Rule 3.10 as follows: 
Rule 3.10 Responsibility of Class Counsel 
The lawyer representing a class of individuals in a class action owes a primary duty of loyalty to 
members of the class defined by the original pleadings filed on behalf of the class, until such 
definition is amended by leave of court. 
Waid, supra note 1, at 1075.  Such a rule would give only the vaguest of direction to class action 
lawyers, but according to Waid, would “provid[e] a foundation for the orderly development of a body 
of ethical opinions and comments” and “would also provide courts with a more stable ground on 
which to evaluate the conduct of class counsel in appropriate cases.”  Id.  I do not find his proposal to 
provide much guidance at all.  For example, I do not understand what it means to say that class 
counsel “owes a primary duty of loyalty to the members of the class” (as opposed to the class as a 
whole—as an entity), because individuals within the class are bound to have differing interests, no 
matter how many subclasses are created.  Id.  Indeed the proposed rule creates additional 
uncertainties, e.g., the implied suggestion that ethics rules impose even greater obligations on the part 
of lawyers toward individual class members than does class action law, which already provides that 
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Before addressing the question of whether such direction should 
come from ethics law or from other law, it is important to consider 
possible conflicts of interest other than those within the class itself—that 
is, conflicts that pit the interests of the class as a whole against either the 
lawyer’s own interests or the lawyer’s duties to another client or third 
person.  Here, too, there has been needless confusion regarding the 
“strict application” of conflict-of-interest rules to class action lawsuits.  
This confusion results from the failure to recognize that not all conflicts 
of interest are meant to be addressed by the conflict-of-interest doctrine 
that is embodied in rules of professional conduct. 
II. CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST DOCTRINE APPLIES TO SOME, BUT NOT 
ALL CONFLICTS INVOLVING THE CLASS ITSELF 
Aside from conflicts within a class, situations that are often viewed 
as creating at least a potential conflict-of-interest include “a prior 
relationship with the named defendant in the class action; . . . a greater 
concern for receiving a fee than for pursuing the class claim; and . . . the 
settlement of claims by collusion rather than through a fair process 
where class members’ interests are adequately represented.”64  Other 
situations include:  the simultaneous representation by class counsel of 
the class itself and individual clients either inside or outside of the class;65 
representation by former class counsel of dissident class members 
objecting to a proposed settlement;66 class counsel serving as class 
representative;67 and the simultaneous negotiation of a class settlement 
and class counsel’s attorneys fees.68 
All these situations involve conflicts between the class (an entity 
client) and either the lawyer’s self-interest or the lawyer’s duties to 
another person.  Therefore, on its face, Model Rule 1.7 would seem to 
 
class counsel has a fiduciary duty toward individual class members.  See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30 (1995) (stating that “attorneys and parties seeking to represent the class 
assume fiduciary responsibilities, and the court bears a residual responsibility to protect the interests 
of class members”). 
Zitrin did not propose any specific language at all, but rather urged the adoption of an ethics rule 
directly addressing representation of a class, utilizing existing case law as a basis for determining the 
content of such a rule.  Zitrin Testimony, supra note 16.  Aside from its lack of specificity, I have two 
problems with the Zitrin approach.  First, I do not believe that the nuances of class action law can be 
adequately captured in code format.  See Moore, supra note 21, at 2222 (noting that “code format may 
be insufficiently flexible to adequately communicate the duties of class action counsel”).  Second, I 
believe that the obligations of class action counsel toward the members of the class should be codified 
or otherwise formulated by those who draft, interpret, and apply rules of civil procedure, as well as the 
constitutional underpinnings of class action law, and not by those who draft, interpret, and apply rules 
of professional ethics.  See infra Part IV. 
 64. Curry, supra note 2, at 397. 
 65. See, e.g., NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 15.24. 
 66. Id. § 15.25. 
 67. Id. § 15.23. 
 68. Id. § 15.31; see also David Brainerd Parrish, Comment, The Dilemma: Simultaneous 
Negotiation of Attorneys’ Fees and Settlement in Class Actions, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 531 (1999). 
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apply.69  Indeed, in some of these situations, courts have reiterated the 
need to relax the conflict rules to accommodate class action lawsuits.70  
Once again, however, it will be helpful to prune away some situations in 
which traditional conflicts rules do not (and should not) apply, in order 
to better determine whether and when a strict reading of these rules 
poses insurmountable difficulties for class actions.  Here I want to 
distinguish between “conflicts of interest” in the broad sense, which 
economists characterize as a form of agency problem,71 and the far 
narrower “conflict-of-interest doctrine,” which is found in Rule 1.7 and 
the other conflicts rules.72 
Conflicts of interest are pervasive in legal practice, and yet only 
some of these conflicts are regulated by traditional conflict-of-interest 
doctrine.  For example, there is always conflict between the client’s 
interest in having the lawyer devote the most time possible to the client’s 
cause at the lowest possible price and the lawyer’s interest in devoting 
the least possible time at the highest possible price.  Yet, the types of 
conflicts that are inherent in establishing fees or in determining how 
much time to allocate to a client’s cause (when the lawyer could be 
devoting time to another client’s matter or to the lawyer’s own leisure 
time) are not addressed by Rule 1.773 or by any other conflict-of-interest 
rule.74  They are typical of what economists characterize as agency 
problems—that is, “the misalignment of interests between agents, such as 
 
 69. See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text. 
 70. For example, courts have permitted former class counsel to represent dissident members of a 
class in opposition to the class itself, even though the conflict rules prohibit representation adverse to a 
former client.  See infra Part III. 
 71. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 45, at 186. 
 72. See generally Nancy J. Moore, What Doctors Can Learn from Lawyers About Conflicts of 
Interest, 81 B.U. L. REV. 445 (2001) (comparing doctors’ and lawyers’ responses to conflict of interest 
problems). 
 73. Prior to the extensive amendments to the Model Rules in February, 2002, the Comment to 
Rule 1.7 did state that “a lawyer’s need for income should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters 
that cannot be handled competently and at a reasonable fee.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.7 cmt. 6 (2001).  The Ethics 2000 Commission recommended that the sentence be deleted on the 
explicit ground that “conflicts between lawyers and prospective clients regarding fee arrangements are 
typically addressed not by ‘conflict of interest’ rules but rather by Rule 1.5, which regulates fees 
directly.”  American Bar Association, Ethics 2000 Commission, Reporter’s Explanation of Changes of 
R. 1.7, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule17rem.html (last visited May 10, 2003).  For a further 
discussion of the inappropriateness of treating fee arrangements under Rule 1.7 rather than under 
Rule 1.5, see Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259, 
286–90 (1997) (acknowledging the Rule 1.7 Comment but concurring with Silver’s conclusion, see 
infra,  that such fees should not be viewed as presenting a conflict of interest problem under Rule 1.7); 
Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing Battle over the 
Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 205 (1997) (criticizing ethics opinion 
declaring unethical bundled flat fees offered by insurers for representation of insureds). 
 74. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2002) (“Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: 
Specific Rules”); id. R. 1.9 (2002) (“Duties to Former Clients”); id. R. 1.10 (2002) (“Imputation of 
Conflicts of Interest: General Rule”); id. R. 1.11 (2002) (“Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and 
Current Government Officers and Employees”); id. R. 1.12 (2002) (“Former Judge, Arbitrator, 
Mediator or Other Third-Party Neutral”). 
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lawyers, and principals, their clients . . . .”75  These types of agency 
problems—the inevitable ones—permeate legal and other professional 
practice.  How they should be regulated is much disputed, but to a large 
extent they are controllable only by relying on lawyers’ professionalism 
and their willingness to exercise good judgment and self-restraint.76  In 
any event, they are not regulated by conflict-of-interest rules, which 
prohibit the lawyer from undertaking the representation absent the 
informed consent of the client.77 
Conflict-of-interest rules do “not purport to regulate circumstances 
that are common to all lawyers, but only circumstances that are unique to 
specific lawyers.”78  In other words, as I have said elsewhere,79 “conflict-
of-interest doctrine in law does not address the largely unavoidable 
conflicts, but only those that can be avoided or removed, by permitting 
(or requiring) clients to seek out other lawyers, that is, lawyers who are 
not burdened with a particular conflict of interest.”80  As a result, 
returning to the class action context, class counsel who has a unique 
conflict (for example, a lawyer who had a prior relationship with the 
defendant81) is governed by conflict-of-interest doctrine, but lawyers with 
unavoidable conflicts (for example, conflicts arising from potentially 
enormous fees82 or simultaneous negotiation of a class settlement and 
class counsel’s attorneys fees83) are not. 
Under this view, Rule 1.7 has no direct relevance to determining the 
appropriate mechanism for compensating class counsel84 or determining 
 
 75. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 45, at 186. 
 76. See Moore, supra note 72, at 450–51.  To the extent that lawyers’ conduct can be regulated in 
these areas of inevitable conflict, the regulations consist of requirements that lawyers represent clients 
competently; with reasonable diligence and promptness; and that they charge fees that are reasonable.  
MODEL RULES R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.5 (2002).  The structure of such regulation is fundamentally different than 
the structure of conflict-of-interest rules, which forbid the lawyer from undertaking the representation 
absent the client’s informed consent.  See, e.g., id. R. 1.7 (2002). 
 77. See supra notes 73–74. 
 78. Moore, supra note 72, at 451 (emphasis added). 
 79. See generally id. 
 80. Id. at 451. 
 81. See, e.g., Palumbo v. Telecomms, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 129 (D.D.C. 1994). 
 82. See supra note 27. 
 83. The conflict of interests is obvious, because “[e]very dollar of reasonable fees awarded serves 
naturally to reduce the recovery fund available to the class.”  NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, § 
15.31.  For a review of different approaches that have been suggested to deal with this problem, see 
Parrish, supra note 68.  None of these approaches relies on an analysis of the conflict under Rule 1.7. 
 84. A draft of the Third Circuit Task Force on the Selection of Class Counsel reported that “fee 
arrangements generally may create conflicts of interest between lawyers and clients,” invoking the 
“material limitation” definition of a conflict under Rule 1.7.  THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON THE 
SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, DRAFT REPORT 26 & n.54 (2001).  The Final Draft deleted the 
explicit reference to Rule 1.7 but continues to refer to conflict of interest concerns arising from the size 
of potential fees in class actions as creating “a material limitation on [class counsels’] responsibilities to 
their clients.”  SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, supra note 34, at 26–27.  Although the change is an 
improvement, it would have been even better to delete the indirect reference to Rule 1.7’s material 
limitation conflicts.  Instead, the rule should rely on the notion of conflicts between class counsel and 
the class regarding fee arrangements as a type of agency problem that is particularly acute in class 
action cases, where the ability of the client to monitor the lawyer is severely curtailed.  See supra note 
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whether simultaneous negotiation of a class settlement and attorneys 
fees should be permitted.85  Of course, it is conceivable that the Model 
Rules could contain a separate class action rule directing lawyer conduct 
in the face of such conflicts, but the direction would proceed in an 
entirely different manner than the conflict-of-interest rules.86  Moreover, 
as I will subsequently argue, it may be better that such direction come 
from class action law, rather than from the ethical rules themselves.87 
Before leaving current conflict-of-interest doctrine, however, I want 
to acknowledge that there are some situations in which the doctrine does 
properly apply to lawyers handling class action lawsuits.  Here I agree 
that the continued viability of class actions may sometimes require 
relaxation—or special application—of the conflicts rules, but I will 
further argue that this is not always the case.  Indeed, it is important to 
consider the crucial role that traditional ethics rules play in protecting 
individual clients whom a class lawyer may choose to represent in 
addition to representing the class as a whole.88 
III. WHEN CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST DOCTRINE DOES APPLY, THE 
VIABILITY OF CLASS ACTIONS MAY, BUT DOES NOT ALWAYS, 
REQUIRE RELAXATION (OR SPECIAL APPLICATION) OF THE CONFLICTS 
RULES 
Conflicts within a class and those arising from the method of 
determining the lawyer’s fee are not regulated by conflict-of-interest 
doctrine under rules of professional conduct; with respect to these types 
of conflicts, it is unnecessary to relax or revise the conflicts rules to 
permit lawyers to represent a class.  But there are other types of conflicts 
that do fall within the proper purview of Model Rule 1.7 and the other 
conflict-of-interest rules.  For example, class counsel may have had an 
attorney-client relationship with the defendant,89 or with another person, 
 
6 and accompanying text (arguing that conflicts of interest in fee arrangements should be viewed as 
governed by Rule 1.5, not Rule 1.7). 
 85. See supra note 84.  Similarly, under this view, modifying Rule 1.7 to cover the lawyer’s duties 
regarding conflicts within a class does not make sense, because class members are not “clients” within 
the meaning of that rule.  See supra Part I (arguing that the class should be viewed as an entity client).  
Moreover, such a modification would also not make sense because these conflicts are not unique to a 
particular lawyer.  As a result, they cannot be regulated through the informed consent of the client.  
See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 86. See supra note 76 (distinguishing structure of conflict-of-interest rules that focus on client 
consent after consultation and other, more direct regulation, such as Rule 1.5(a), which requires that 
lawyer fees be reasonable). 
 87. See infra Part IV. 
 88. Although I refer here (and subsequently) to “individual” clients, I do not mean to exclude 
entity clients such as corporations and partnerships.  I use the term “individual” to better distinguish 
between representation of the class itself and representation of other clients, both inside and outside 
the class. 
 89. See, e.g., Curry, supra note 2, at 399–401 (discussing Palumbo v. Tele-Communications, Inc., 
157 F.R.D. 129 (D.D.C. 1994), where court disqualified plaintiff class counsel on ground that he had 
previously been a part owner and board member of one of the defendant company’s affiliates); see 
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perhaps a class member, who might have been named as a defendant.90  
Indeed, it is not uncommon for lawyers representing a class to 
simultaneously represent some, but not all of the individual members of 
the class91 or to simultaneously represent the class and other clients suing 
the same defendant with similar92 or different claims.93 
Consider, for example, In re Agent Orange,94 in which a plaintiff’s 
management committee moved to disqualify counsel representing class 
members who opposed the proposed settlement, on the ground that the 
lawyers had previously served as class counsel (along with several other 
lawyers).  One of the lawyers had participated in negotiating the 
proposed settlement on behalf of the class, and both had served as 
members of the plaintiffs’ management committee.95  In considering the 
motion to disqualify, the court noted that traditional principles in 
nonclass action litigation support disqualification whenever “‘the former 
client . . . show[s] no more than that the matters embraced within the 
pending suit wherein his former attorney appears . . . are substantially 
related to the matters or cause of action where the attorney previously 
represented him, the former client.’”96  These principles parallel Rule 1.9 
of the Model Rules, which prohibits an attorney from undertaking 
representation adverse to a former client in the same or a substantially 
related matter.97 
 
also In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 133 F.R.D. 425, 430 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dictum) 
(“There is no question that prior representation of an adversary in a current matter might give rise to a 
conflict of interest, especially where the prior representation would enable counsel to disclose 
confidences.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Tedesco v. Mishkin, 689 F. Supp. 1327, 1338, 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (A proposed 
class representative who had been named as co-trustee of one of the investment trusts involved in the 
class action could not serve as a representative of the plaintiff class; the class counsel had to withdraw 
from representing that co-trustee in his individual capacity.). 
 91. See, e.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1208 (5th Cir. 1982) (The lead class counsel 
represented a number of the named representatives individually in this employment discrimination 
action; all but one dismissed him as their attorney because of objections to the proposed settlement.). 
 92. E.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff’d sub nom.  
Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (The class counsel represented inventories of the 
plaintiffs with asbestos claims who were not included in the class as defined in the proposed 
settlement.).  For an extensive discussion of this decision, see Koniak, supra note 2. 
 93. E.g., Jackshaw Pontiac, Inc. v. Cleveland Press Publ’g Co., 102 F.R.D. 183, 190–93 (N.D. 
Ohio 1984) (The class counsel also represented the plaintiffs in another action against the 
defendants—a state court suit brought by the former, rather than the current employees; the former 
employees and proposed class were seeking to tap the same pool of defendant assets.).  Sometimes 
class counsel attempt to represent two separate classes with different claims against the same 
defendant.  See, e.g., Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825, 826–31 (1st Cir. 1987) (disqualifying legal 
services organization from representing a class of female inmates in a gender discrimination action 
against the state of New Hampshire because it simultaneously represented a class of mentally retarded 
residents of a state school suing the state over the conditions at the school). 
 94. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 95. Id. at 16–17. 
 96. Id. at 17 (quoting T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 
(S.D.N.Y. 1953)). 
 97. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2002) (“A lawyer who has formerly 
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a 
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Given that class counsel formerly represented the class,98 it follows 
that under a strict reading of Rule 1.9, these lawyers would have been 
prohibited from representing dissident class members in an action 
adverse to the class.  Moreover, outside the class action context, these 
lawyers would normally have been disqualified from continuing the 
representation.99  Nevertheless, the Agent Orange court did not grant the 
motion to disqualify, invoking Judge Adams’s concurring opinion in In re 
Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation,100 in which he noted that “although 
automatic disqualification might ‘promote the salutary ends of 
confidentiality and loyalty, it would have a serious adverse effect on class 
actions.’”101  This is so because “the class action may be the only practical 
means of vindicating [the] rights [of many individuals with small claims]” 
and “[i]n such class actions, often only the attorneys who have 
represented the class, rather than any of the class members themselves, 
have substantial familiarity with the prior proceedings, the fruits of 
 
substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of 
the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”). 
 98. It is not entirely clear from the opinion whether the court viewed class counsel as having 
formerly represented the class as an entity or its individual members.  There is certainly some 
language suggesting that the court believed there was an attorney-client relationship between counsel 
and each of the members of the class.  See Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 18 (stating that by taking a 
position favoring one faction of the class, the attorney is “opposing the interests of some of his former 
clients in the very matter in which he has represented them”).  Under the entity view of class 
representation, class counsel seeking to represent dissident class members attacking a settlement 
approved by the court might argue that he is not actually opposing his former client—the class—but 
rather is seeking to advance a different view of what action is in the best interests of the class.  The 
situation is analogous to a lawyer for a corporation who attempts to represent the plaintiffs in a 
shareholder derivative action brought against corporate officers and directors to recover damages to 
the corporation itself.  There, the corporation remains a nominal defendant in the action, and if the 
representation involves the same or a substantially related matter in which the lawyer had previously 
represented the corporation, I am confident that the representation would be viewed as a violation of 
Rule 1.9.  Cf. Goldstein v. Lees, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253, 257–59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that it was 
improper for a former in-house counsel to a corporation to represent minority shareholder and 
director in a proxy fight designed to gain control of the same corporation).  On the other hand, 
continued representation of the class itself, in opposition to the dissident class members, would not 
violate Rule 1.9.  See infra note 99. 
 99. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  The court also indicated that it thought traditional 
rules would warrant disqualification of counsel who continues to represent the class, in opposition to 
dissident class members challenging the settlement, because the lawyer, like former class counsel in 
Agent Orange, “would be opposing the interests of some of his former clients in the very matter in 
which he has represented them.”  Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 18.  I disagree with this conclusion, 
however, and therefore believe that the two situations are distinguishable.  A lawyer for a class does 
not represent individual class members; rather, she represents the class as a whole, i.e., as an entity.  
See supra Part I.  Accordingly, dissident class members are not former clients under Rule 1.9, just as 
current class members are not clients under Rule 1.7.  Continuing with the analogy to a shareholder’s 
derivative action, it is commonly held that corporate counsel may be entitled to represent the 
corporation in an action brought by a dissident shareholder.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 131 cmt. g (2000) (“[I]f . . . disinterested directors conclude that no 
basis exists for the claim that the defending officers and directors have acted against the interests of 
the organization, the lawyer may, with the effective consent of all clients, represent both the 
organization and the officers and directors in defending the suit.”). 
 100. 748 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 101. Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 18. 
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discovery, the actual potential of the litigation.”102  Thus, the Agent 
Orange court held: 
A motion to disqualify an attorney who has represented the entire 
class and who has thereafter been retained by a faction of the class 
to represent its interest in opposition to a proposed settlement of 
the action cannot be automatically granted.  Rather, there must be 
a balancing of the interests of the various groups of class members 
and of the interest of the public and the court in achieving a just and 
expeditious resolution of the dispute.103 
Finding no allegations that actual prejudice would result if the lawyers 
were not disqualified, the court denied the motion.104 
A similar result was reached in Tedesco v. Mishkin,105 although 
there the court did not expressly confront the implications of the ethics 
rules.  In Tedesco, investors involved in various enterprises organized 
and controlled by the defendants filed a class action lawsuit alleging 
fraud and racketeering in connection with the investments.106  After 
certification of the class, defendants moved to remove certain named 
plaintiffs and to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel.107  The court granted the 
motion to remove one of the plaintiffs as a named representative on the 
ground that he was for a time a co-trustee of one of the investment funds 
and thus might be liable to the class if the class prevailed at trial.108  But 
the court refused to disqualify the lawyer for the class, even though he 
simultaneously represented the co-trustee on an individual basis.109  The 
court acknowledged that there was a potential conflict of interest 
between the class and the co-trustee, which is why he had been removed 
as a class representative.110  As a remedy, however, the court did not 
direct that his lawyer be removed as class counsel, but rather that class 
counsel be directed to withdraw from representing the co-trustee in his 
individual capacity.111  In refusing to disqualify class counsel, the court 
relied both on the practical difficulties of “[s]ecuring new counsel for the 
class at this point of the litigation” and the court’s ongoing role in 
monitoring and protecting the interests of the class.112 
 
 102. Id. at 18–19; see also In re Corn Derivatives, 748 F.2d at 164 (Adams, J., concurring) (“[A] 
rule requiring automatic disqualification may well penalize dissent, and thereby deprive the court of 
the important assistance which objecting class members render by challenging the fairness of a class 
action settlement.”). 
 103. Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 19; see also Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 588–90 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (citing and quoting both Agent Orange and Judge Adams’s concurring opinion in Corn 
Derivatives). 
 104. Agent Orange, 800 F.2d at 19–20. 
 105. 689 F. Supp. 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 106. Id. at 1330. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1336–37. 
 109. Id. at 1339–40. 
 110. Id. at 1340. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  According to the court: 
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In each of these two cases, the court refused to disqualify class 
counsel because of what it perceived as special considerations applying to 
class action lawsuits.  Both decisions can be defended; however, the fact 
that they are justified does not necessarily mean that the ethical rules 
should be modified to reflect their rulings.  After all, even in civil 
litigation outside of the class action context, the standards for 
disqualification and discipline are not always the same.113  But the two 
cases are distinguishable and, as such, illustrate the complex relationship 
between ethics law and other law. 
For example, it makes no sense to view the result in Agent Orange 
as a product of differing ethical standards for disqualification and 
disciplinary purposes.  If the particular needs of class litigation are such 
that class counsel must be free to switch from representing the class to 
representing dissident class members opposing a settlement, as Agent 
Orange suggests,114 then class counsel should not be subject to discipline 
for doing so.  In Tedesco, however, the lawyer, it can be argued, should 
have been subject to disciplinary action for violating Model Rule 1.7 
when he agreed to simultaneously represent both the co-trustee and the 
class—that is, if he failed to adequately inform the co-trustee of the risks 
involved in the simultaneous representation of the co-trustee and the 
class of which he was a member.115  After all, the co-trustee was free to 
retain separate counsel, and insisting that he be permitted to do so at the 
outset would not have endangered the viability or the efficacy of the class 
action device.116 
 
Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced in the prosecution of the securities and other fraud class 
actions and have a record of successful results in such actions.  The court has carefully monitored 
plaintiffs’ attorneys through the course of this action.  Plaintiffs’ counsel competently presented 
evidence in a five day civil contempt hearing against Mishkin.  In addition, they have periodically 
submitted to the court comprehensive reports on the progress of discovery.  The interests of the 
class would be well served by continued representation by plaintiffs’ counsel. 
Id. 
 113. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 71, 73 (1996) 
[D]isqualification should not be a per se remedy for a violation of a conflict rule, . . . on the 
contrary, the court’s determination should not be based on the conflicts rule at all.  The conflict 
rules, which are designed to apply to a lawyer’s decision at the outset of the representation, would 
be overly restrictive if applied by courts in the disqualification setting after the representation is 
under way. 
Id. at 73. 
 114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting that having a conflict under Rule 1.7, 
representation is impermissible unless the clients give informed consent and the conflict is determined 
to be consentable). 
 116. It is unclear from the opinion whether the lawyer had already decided to pursue a class 
action lawsuit at the time the co-trustee became a client.  It does not matter, however.  If the lawyer 
already represented a putative class, then a conflict of interest arose under Rule 1.7, which required 
the co-trustee to be fully informed prior to agreeing to be represented by class counsel.  If the lawyer 
had not yet decided to pursue a class action lawsuit, then he was obligated to consult with his co-
trustee client regarding both the advantages and disadvantages of bringing the lawsuit as a class action 
(thus implicating Rules 1.2 and 1.4) and the conflicts of interest inherent in taking on the class as an 
additional client (thus implicating Rule 1.7).  See supra text accompanying notes 105–112; see also infra 
notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
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There is an important lesson here for class counsel with regard to 
their relationships with individual class members.  For example, it is 
critically important to determine which, if any, of those class members 
are or will be individual clients of the lawyer.  In cases involving such 
trivial amounts of money that it makes no sense to bring the action 
except as a class action,117 the lawyer is unlikely to want to represent any 
of the class members individually, including the named representatives.  
Because these individuals may be confused about the lawyer’s role, 
however, Model Rule 4.3 requires the lawyer to make reasonable efforts 
to correct any misunderstanding.118  Such efforts should include a clear 
statement that the lawyer will represent the class as a whole, not any 
individual member, as well as an explanation of the role of both the 
lawyer and the individual members at various stages of the proceedings. 
In other situations—for example, mass torts and employment 
discrimination—individuals often come to the lawyer with claims 
sufficiently large to warrant traditional litigation.119  Here, the lawyer 
might form an attorney-client relationship with one or more individuals 
before any decision is made to pursue the claims in a class action lawsuit.  
Putting aside the lawyer’s obligations to the putative class, the lawyer has 
clear obligations to her existing clients.  First, she must consider whether 
pursuing the litigation as a class action is in the best interests of the 
individual clients.120  If not, then the lawyer may not recommend such 
action merely because it would benefit other individuals (or the lawyer 
herself).121  The second obligation is to consult with the clients to 
determine whether they agree to participate in a class action.122  The 
consultation should include a full description of the extent to which the 
clients will be relinquishing control of the litigation once the class 
 
 117. These cases are sometimes referred to as “small claim” class actions.  See, e.g., Shapiro, supra 
note 43, at 923–24. 
 118. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2002) 
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not 
state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.  When the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer 
shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding . . . . 
 119. Such cases are sometimes deemed inappropriate for class action treatment at all.  See, e.g., 
Shapiro, supra note 43, at 926–27. 
 120. A client’s interests might include not only the recovery of monetary damages, but also the 
correction of an injustice on a class-wide basis. 
 121. Cf. Koniak, supra note 2, at 1137–39 (discussing client who retained law firm to bring an 
action for an asbestos-related illness who was asked to be a class representative, even though her 
individual action could have been settled as one of many “present inventory” cases that were 
apparently settled on a basis more favorable than the proposed class settlement). 
 122. See MODEL RULES R. 1.4(b) (2002) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”).  
The decision whether to bring an individual action or a class action should be viewed as an “objective” 
of the representation, as to which agreement by the client, and not merely consultation, is required.  
See id. R. 1.2(a) (2002) (“A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the 
representation . . . .”); cf. Koniak, supra note 2, at 1139–41 (suggesting that a client who retained 
lawyer to bring individual lawsuit agreed to be a class representative because she thought that was the 
only way to get money from the defendants). 
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complaint is filed.123  Finally, the lawyer must avoid the impermissible 
representation of conflicting interests by informing existing clients of the 
risks of the lawyer taking on the class as an additional client and 
obtaining the clients’ informed consent to the conflict.124 
IV. PROTECTING THE CLASS AGAINST CONFLICTS ARISING FROM THE 
LAWYER’S DUTIES TO OTHERS (AND CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CLASS 
ITSELF) 
In Tedesco, the lawyer’s simultaneous representation of the class 
itself and an individual class member who could have been sued as a 
defendant created an obvious conflict of interest affecting the 
representation of the individual member-client.125  In the previous part, I 
argued that this conflict should have been resolved under a 
straightforward application of Model Rule 1.7.126  In this part, I will 
consider the application of Rule 1.7 to the same conflict as it affects the 
representation of the class.  The situation is analogous to one of several 
conflicts in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,127 in which class counsel 
represented a large “inventory” of “present claimants” with claims 
similar to those of the putative “futures class” members but who were 
not included in the class itself.128  When a negotiated settlement of the 
futures class claims was presented for court approval (on the same day 
the complaint was filed), a group of objectors argued the inadequacy of 
class counsel on the ground that the simultaneous representation of 
present and future claimants constituted an impermissible conflict of 
interest.129  Two professors of legal ethics testified that such concurrent 
representation constituted an impermissible conflict under Rule 1.7,130 
 
 123. See supra note 46 (discussing that class counsel can recommend a settlement over the 
objection of the named representatives). 
 124. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 1.7). 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 105–112. 
 126. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 127. 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. 
Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 519 U.S. 957 (1996), and aff’d, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 128. Id. at 294–96.  As Susan Koniak has argued, the terminology used by the court may be 
misleading, because there were members of the class who had already suffered harm and were 
arguably indistinguishable from the inventory clients who received settlements outside the class itself.  
See Koniak, supra note 2, at 1137–51 (arguing that named plaintiffs could have been included in 
inventory settlements but were kept out in order to serve as class representatives); see also Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 1190 & n.131 (like Koniak, adopting nomenclature of “present 
clients” and “future claimants” to more accurately describe the facts in Georgine).  Nevertheless, this 
is the terminology used by the court and I believe it is sufficiently clear for my purposes. 
 129. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 294–305. 
 130. Id. at 296–97 (discussing testimony of Professor Roger Cramton of Cornell Law School); id. 
at 302–03 (discussing testimony of Professor Susan P. Koniak of Boston University School of Law). 
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while two other professors testified that class counsel did not have an 
impermissible conflict.131 
Under a straightforward analysis of Rule 1.7, I agree that the dual 
representation created at least a potentially impermissible conflict of 
interest.  From the outset, the risks to the class should have been clear.  
First, the defendants were reluctant to negotiate with the present 
claimants until there was at least some assurance that the futures claims 
would be resolved,132 creating an incentive for class counsel to sacrifice 
the interests of the class in order to settle the matter quickly.  In addition, 
the less money the lawyers demanded for the class, the more money 
there would be available for the present claimants;133 given that class 
counsel would almost certainly receive a greater percentage of the 
amounts recovered under their individual fee agreements with the 
present claimants than they would from the recovery for the class, they 
had every reason to favor the present claimants over the futures class.134  
Certainly, any lawyer who simultaneously represented just one present 
claimant and one future claimant would have had a potentially 
impermissible conflict under Rule 1.7.135 
Of course, when lawyers represent individual claimants, potentially 
impermissible conflicts are typically curable with the informed consent of 
each client.136  Similarly, most entity clients can also consent to a conflict 
through whatever decisional mechanism is available under the law 
 
 131. Id. at 297–99 (discussing testimony of Professor Geoffrey Hazard of Yale Law School, then 
the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Professor John P. Freeman of the University of South 
Carolina Scool of Law). 
 132. Id. at 294 (“In general . . . CCR determined to continue to make inventory settlements only if 
it could obtain some kind of protection for the future.”). 
 133. The reverse is also true:  the more money the lawyers demanded for the class, the less money 
there would be available for the present claimants.  This aspect of the conflict is one that should have 
been fully disclosed to the present claimants, whom I have argued deserved the full benefit of a 
rigorous application of Rule 1.7.  See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (raising this concern). 
I am not arguing that the representation of multiple claimants against a single defendant always 
presents a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(b).  If the claims are dissimilar and there is no reason to 
believe that the settlement value of one will affect the settlement value of another, then arguably there 
is no conflict.  Here, however, there is no question that the defendant viewed the inventory 
settlements and future class settlement as significantly linked.  See supra note 132 and accompanying 
text. 
 134. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class 
Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 661 & n.57 (2002) (comparing typical “benchmark” of 
25% in class action fee awards, with the “standard ‘voluntary’ contingency fee of 33% to 40%”; citing 
1996 study finding that median rates of recovery ranged in class actions ranged from 2.7% to 3.0%).  It 
is possible that even with a lower percentage award, the overall size of the legal fees likely to be 
awarded under a settlement of the futures class would be higher than the total legal fees earned in the 
settlement of the individuals’ claims.  If so, then class counsel might have been tempted to sacrifice the 
interests of some or all of the present claimants in favor of the futures class.  This is a risk that should 
be considered in determining the propriety of the representation of the present claimants under Rule 
1.7.  See supra note 133. 
 135. Again, I do not want to argue that representing multiple claimants against a single defendant 
always presents a conflict of interests under Rule 1.7(b).  See supra note 134.  Here, however, where 
every settlement was likely to become a precedent for future settlements, the defendants were 
necessarily prone to viewing present and future claimants as presenting competing claims. 
 136. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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governing the particular entity.137  But class entities do not currently have 
such a decisional mechanism,138 which is, presumably, why the two ethics 
experts testified that the conflict was not merely potentially 
impermissible, but was in fact impermissible.139 
If Rule 1.7 is applied straightforwardly, then, I would agree that the 
dual representation in Georgine was clearly unethical, given both the 
existence of a conflict and the lack of informed consent on behalf of the 
class.  But this is not necessarily the best way of proceeding in cases like 
Georgine, Tedesco, and all of the other class actions in which, as is fairly 
common, class counsel represents individuals—both within140 and outside 
of the class141—with interests that might conflict with the interests of the 
class itself. 
The particular conflicts in Georgine and Tedesco were severe and, 
arguably, so compromised the interests of the class that some form of 
remedy was desirable.  But it is not necessarily desirable to create a per 
se ethical prohibition on the simultaneous representation of both a class 
and individuals with interests potentially at odds with those of the class.  
Consider, for example, a class action brought by individuals with 
substantial employment discrimination claims against a defendant:  in all 
likelihood, the case will begin with the representation of one or more 
individual employees.  A decision will then be made to bring the action 
as a class action, perhaps in order to bring more pressure to bear upon 
the defendant.  There is no certainty that the putative class will actually 
be certified, thus it makes no sense for the lawyer to abandon the 
individual claimants in favor of representing the class alone.142  And even 
if a separate lawyer could be found who is willing to represent the class 
alone, it may be inefficient to have more than one lawyer or law firm 
involved in the particular case.  If the risks to the class are small in 
relation to the potential benefits of pursuing the action with the same 
lawyer representing both the class and some or all of the named 
 
 137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 131 cmt. e (2000) 
(“Consent by an organization can be given in any manner consistent with the organization’s lawful 
decisionmaking procedures.”). 
 138. See supra note 33. 
 139. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 1190–93 
(concluding, after examining the different expert opinions in Georgine, that there was a material 
limitation conflict in Georgine and that the crux of the ethical problem is the difficulty of resolving the 
consent issue in class actions). 
 140. See, e.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1982); Blanchard v. Edgemark Fin. 
Corp., 175 F.R.D. 293 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Phila. Elec. Co., v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557 
(E.D. Pa. 1969); see also NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 1, at 15–46 (stating that when class counsel 
contacts class members to seek additional plaintiffs, it is not unlikely that such class members would 
want to retain class counsel as their attorney). 
 141. See, e.g., Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987); Jackshaw Pontiac, Inc. v. 
Cleveland Press Publ’g Co., 102 F.R.D. 183 (N.D. Ohio 1984). 
 142. Nor would it make sense to say that at the moment of class certification the lawyer ceases to 
be counsel for the individuals and becomes counsel for the class alone, because class counsel owes 
duties to the class even before it is certified.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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representatives, then, arguably, it is in the best interest of the class to 
permit this type of multiple representation in at least some cases. 
If so, the question then becomes how best to achieve this end 
without thereby approving multiple representation in all cases.  Staying 
within the framework of Rule 1.7, we could look to the court to give 
consent on behalf of the class.143  One problem with this solution is that 
courts are not available to consent to prefiling conflicts;144 another 
problem is that even at the time the class action complaint is filed, the 
nature and extent of the conflict may not be known.  An alternative 
solution would be to do as was proposed to both the Kutak and Ethics 
2000 Commissions and draft an entirely new ethics rule—one that 
modifies the application of Rule 1.7 in the context of class actions.145  
And, while modifying Rule 1.7 to protect the class against a lawyer’s 
conflicts, we could simultaneously address the problem of the lawyer’s 
obligations with regard to conflicts within the class—a problem not 
currently addressed under conflict-of-interest doctrine because the class 
itself is the client, not the individual members (or even groups of 
members) within the class.146  Professor Richard Zitrin, for example, 
proposed that the Commission adopt an ethics rule directly addressing 
representation of a class, utilizing existing class action case law as a basis 
for determining the content of such a rule.147 
Here my concern is that ethics code drafters have neither the 
expertise nor the authority148 to determine the appropriate relationships 
between class action counsel and the various constituents of a class.  
Moreover, given the courts’ current ability (and obligation) to monitor 
the adequacy of representation as part of the class action lawsuit,149 I 
 
 143. See supra note 33 (discussing R. 1.8); see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 1193 
(discussing the possibility that “the court can consider itself the ‘consenting’ party—in essence, ruling 
from the basis of the fairness hearing that the parties either have constructively consented or would 
consent to such a ‘fair’ deal and the work of class counsel”); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.8 cmt. (2001). 
 144. Thus, the one commentator who has discussed this solution presumes that the court’s consent 
would come at the time of the fairness hearing.  See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 1193. 
 145. See supra notes 21, 62 and accompanying text.  Neither the Waid nor the Zitrin proposal 
suggested specifically how the conflicts of interest rule should be modified in the context of class 
actions. 
 146. See supra Part I. 
 147. See supra note 62. 
 148. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 1188 (“[T]hese cases also present difficult questions of 
authority and power.”). 
 149. Rule 23(a)(4) provides that a class action can be maintained only if “the representative 
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).  Absent 
adequacy of representation, the attempt to bind absent members of the class may violate due process.  
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 
32, 42–43, 45 (1940)).  In making this determination, courts typically seek to determine the ability of 
the named representatives to adequately represent the class.  See, e.g., Robin v. Doctors Officenters 
Corp., 686 F. Supp. 199 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
The court’s primary concern in determining the adequacy of representation is whether the class 
representative has a common interest with the class and has vigorously prosecuted its interests.  A 
representative cannot adequately protect the class if his interests are antagonistic to or in conflict 
with the interests of those he represents. 
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suggest that what makes the most sense is to leave these issues to be 
resolved under class action law—namely, under the rubric of a further 
elaboration of the adequacy of representation requirement of FRCP 
Rule 23.150  In other words, when a lawyer has a conflict of interest that 
might affect her representation of a class,151 class action law will trump 
any application of Model Rule 1.7.152  In addition, the ethics rules will not 
purport to define a lawyer’s obligations to the individual members (or 
even groups of members), leaving these issues to be addressed by class 
action law.153 
This is not, however, the end of the story.  It would be useful for 
class action law to more clearly require courts to consider class counsel’s 
conflicts as an important factor in determining the adequacy of 
representation under Rule 23.154  Strictly speaking, the court would not 
 
Id. at 203.  In addition, however, courts consider the adequacy of class counsel, including an 
examination of “the nature of the relationship between the named plaintiffs and counsel; counsel’s 
experience in handling the type of litigation involved; counsel’s motivation; counsel’s support staff; 
and counsel’s other professional commitments.”  Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 117 F.R.D. 394, 401 
(N.D. Ill. 1987).  An attorney’s conflicts of interest have sometimes led to a finding that counsel was 
inadequate, particularly when the attorney is a member of the class or is related to a member of the 
class.  See, e.g., Zylstra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Kurczi v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 160 F.R.D. 667, 679 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (finding class counsel inadequate when class counsel 
represented individual plaintiffs in parallel state court action).  The relationship between the adequacy 
of representation determination and rules of professional conduct is not clear.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. 
KLONOFF & EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION 152 n.8 
(2000) (raising questions concerning the standards courts should apply in finding an attorney’s 
conflicts renders the representation inadequate). 
Courts also monitor the fairness of any proposed settlement, but determining adequacy of 
representation and the fairness of a settlement are two entirely distinct inquiries.  Cf. Lazy Oil Co. v. 
Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming district court’s approval of class action settlement 
and order refusing to remove or disqualify class counsel). 
 150. Currently, there is very little in the way of “class action law” that addresses the question of 
the adequacy of representation by counsel burdened by a conflict of interest.  See supra note 149.  
Indeed, at present, courts will attempt to bypass the procedural requirement by first referring to and 
then modifying the requirements under ethics law.  See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text. 
 151. I refer here to the type of conflicts traditionally considered under conflict-of-interest 
doctrine, not the broader type of conflicts that would not typically call for any analysis under Rule 1.7.  
See supra Part II. 
 152. My thanks to Susan Koniak for making this point.  If there were a body of class action law 
that clearly addressed the adequacy of representation of class counsel burdened by a conflict of 
interests, then I would suggest adding a comment to Rule 1.7, stating that the ethical propriety of class 
representation under such circumstances must be determined by reference to such other law.  In that 
case, we would no longer need to view such law as “trumping” Rule 1.7. 
 153. There is an analogy here to the Ethics 2000 Commission’s decision rejecting another of 
Richard Zitrin’s proposals—to adopt an ethics rule prohibiting lawyers from participating in secret 
settlements when there is a danger to the public.  See Nancy J. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in 
the Twenty-First Century, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 923 (2002).  There the Commission’s reasoning was 
that lawyers should not be prohibited from advising their clients regarding conduct that is lawful for 
the client.  In other words, ethics rules should not attempt to regulate secret settlements by enacting 
rules applicable only to lawyers.  Similarly, the rights of named representatives and class members 
should be resolved as a matter of class action law, not ethics law. 
 154. In ruling on motions to disqualify class counsel on grounds of a conflict affecting the interests 
of the class, the court should use the same standards as would be applied if the court were ruling on 
the adequacy of class counsel at a certification hearing, with the caveat that denial of the motion to 
disqualify does not represent a final determination of the adequacy of class counsel, given that the 
facts regarding the severity of the conflict may have developed substantially in the intervening period. 
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be applying Rule 1.7 at all.  Nevertheless, many of the principles and 
concepts underlying that rule could be taken into account in the Rule 23 
analysis.  Thus, in Georgine, the simultaneous representation of “present 
claimants” and a class of “future claimants” should have led the trial 
court to scrutinize the adequacy of representation far more carefully than 
it would have in the absence of such a conflict,155 particularly in light of 
persuasive evidence of the significantly different treatment these two 
groups received under their respective settlements.156  Similarly, in 
determining whether the creation of subclasses (with separate 
representation) was necessary to meet the adequacy of representation 
requirement under Rule 23, the trial court should have considered the 
extent of divergence of the interests of various groups within the class, as 
was subsequently held by the Supreme Court of the United States in that 
case.157  Both these determinations can be helpfully informed by the 
underlying principles and concepts of Rule 1.7:  for example, recognizing 
the extent to which conflicts tempt a lawyer to favor one group over 
another or to ignore important differences between individuals or groups 
in order to achieve a resolution of either or both sets of claims, and 
understanding the concept that some conflicts pose risks so severe that 
they are deemed nonconsentable.158 
CONCLUSION 
Providing greater guidance to lawyers was one of the paramount 
goals of the Ethics 2000 Commission.159  Given the current confusion 
surrounding the ethics of class action lawyers,160 the Commission was 
certainly inclined to provide additional guidance in these cases, if at all 
possible.  Nevertheless, it reluctantly concluded that there was little that 
could be done through the vehicle of an ethics code.161  After all, it is not 
for ethics regulators to determine who is the client of a class action 
lawyer or what specific duties are owed by the lawyer to those persons 
(such as class representatives or absent class members) who are certainly 
not clients in any traditional sense.162  In the Commission’s view, these 
 
 155. Cf., e.g., In re PaineWebber Ltd. P’ships Litig., 171 F.R.D. 104, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(referring to a “‘higher’ or ‘closer’ level of scrutiny that applies to judicial review of settlements 
involving settlement classes”). 
 156. The mere fact that the two groups were treated differently does not mean that the settlement 
was unfair.  Adequate representation is determined separate and apart from the overall fairness of the 
settlement.  See supra note 147. 
 157. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).  For a critique of the Amchem 
opinion, see Silver & Baker, supra note 28, at 1491 (arguing that interclient tradeoffs are inevitable). 
 158. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
 159. Cf. Moore, supra note 153, at 930 (“Mindful of the educational role of the Rules, the 
Commission proposed a number of changes designed primarily to give greater guidance for lawyers, 
thus enhancing the likelihood of compliance with the Rules as professional norms.”). 
 160. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
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are matters for determination and elaboration by rules of civil procedure 
and courts that interpret and apply such rules.163 
The scope of the problem, however, may not be nearly as large as is 
often supposed.  If, for example, courts would clarify that the client of a 
class action lawyer is the class itself—an entity client—then it would be 
readily apparent that traditional conflict rules, like Model Rule 1.7, 
simply do not apply to the different, and potentially conflicting, interests 
of individual class members; therefore, these rules need not be modified 
in order to accommodate the class action device.164  Similarly, lawyers 
should recognize that some conflicts of interest—such as conflicts over 
the size of the lawyer’s fee—are endemic to law practice and were never 
meant to be addressed under conflict-of-interest rules.  Of course, courts 
supervising class actions are free to adopt procedures to ensure that class 
counsel’s fees are reasonable, but they need not worry that they are by-
passing the conflict-of-interest rules.  As for those conflicts that are 
subject to Rule 1.7—such as the simultaneous representation of a class 
and persons inside or outside the class—this article has argued that 
individual clients are entitled to full protection of the conflict rules, so 
that they can determine for themselves whether they would be better 
served by retaining independent counsel.165 
The problem that remains is not insubstantial, however.  From the 
perspective of the class itself, there may be good reason to avoid “strict” 
application of the conflict rules in some cases, but not necessarily in all 
cases.  In my view, elaborating the circumstances under which these 
conflicts should be tolerated is best done not by ethics code drafters, but 
rather by courts interpreting and applying the adequacy of 
representation requirement of FRCP Rule 23.  In doing so, courts should 
consider the underlying principles and concepts of the ethics rules.  They 
should do so, however, not as a matter of bending the ethics rules, but 
rather of elaborating the necessary details of class action law—a law 




 163. See supra notes 21–22. 
 164. As previously noted, it is not necessary to adopt the entity client view to conclude that Rule 
1.7 does not apply to conflict of interest within the class, but there are important advantages to doing 
so.  See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra Part III. 
